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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the health care system in the United States has come to be 
dominated almost entirely by large health maintenance organizations [hereinafter 
“HMOs”]1 and insurance providers.  This trend has proven to deprive physicians of 
their decision-making authority when it comes to the administration of care, with the 
ultimate result of reducing the quality of health care services provided to consumers.  
The market dominance enjoyed by these entities is primarily the product of the 
current state and federal antitrust laws, which have effectively tied the hands of 
independently practicing physicians by preventing them from banding together in 
their contract negotiations with these types of managed care providers [hereinafter 
“MCPs”].2  As such, a substantive change in our national antitrust laws is required in 
                                                                
1HMOs are essentially legal entities that provide comprehensive health care for private 
parties in return for scheduled advance payments at a predetermined fixed rate.  See 
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: HEALTH 
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS CAN HELP CONTROL HEALTH CARE COSTS 1 (1980).  HMOs 
are not to be confused with PPOs, or preferred provider organizations, which are organizations 
comprised of a select panel of health care providers that jointly market their services under 
such pretences as greater cost efficiency, quality, and accessibility.  See PEAT MARWICK, 
DIMENSIONS IN HEALTH CARE 1 (1985). 
2PEAT MARWICK, supra note 1, at 1.  
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order to equalize the imbalance of power between physicians and MCPs, and to 
ensure the availability of the highest quality of care. 
The text to follow is intended to provide an overview of the legal basis for the 
imbalance of power currently inherent to the health care industry, suggesting several 
reasons for its development.  It also provides an outline of the current basis for 
antitrust liability in this country and describes some possible solutions.  The most 
practical and effective means through which to rectify this imbalance would be to 
enact new federal legislation that would amend the antitrust laws to allow for limited 
“unionization” of independently practicing physicians for collective bargaining 
purposes. 
I.  REASONS FOR THE IMBALANCE  
A.  Lack of Enforcement of Antitrust Laws Against HMOs 
The bargaining position of independent physicians is substantially weakened by 
the lack of significant enforcement of the antitrust laws by the Federal Trade 
Commission [hereinafter “FTC”] and the Department of Justice [hereinafter “DOJ”] 
against managed care and insurance companies.  Even in the face of the considerable 
market dominance in many localities by a single HMO, the federal enforcement 
agencies charged with the enforcement of the antitrust laws seem reluctant to 
interfere with their growth.  In fact, Robert F. Liebenluft, former assistant director 
for health care in the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, has reportedly stated that the 
federal agencies “had rarely, if ever, challenged an HMO merger.”3  In some 
markets, MPCs have amassed more than fifty percent of the health care market, yet 
the FTC and the DOJ have done little more than rubber stamp the mergers and 
acquisitions of these large health plans.4  This apparent lack of enforcement of the 
antitrust laws against HMOs allows such entities to accumulate even greater 
dominance in health care and serves to undermine the limited bargaining power that 
independent physicians enjoy. 
B.  Limited Exemption From Antitrust Liability For Insurance Companies 
Insurance companies are also treated in a more preferential light by the federal 
government in regards to antitrust matters, thereby further weakening the bargaining 
power of independent physicians and lessening their control over treatment of their 
patients.  In the United States, the regulation and taxation of the insurance business is 
left primarily to the states.5  In 1945 the U.S. government enacted the McCarran-
                                                                
3Concern Rising About Health Plan Mergers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1999, at 1C. 
4E. Ratcliffe Anderson, Jr., M.D., Statement of the American Medical Association to the 
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (June 22, 1999), at 9 (stating 
Alpha Center review of HMO market shares in twenty-five states revealed that the largest five 
insurers control the care administered to more than 50% of the insured citizens of twenty-three 
states and more than 70% of the insured citizens in sixteen of those states).  Smaller, “local” 
health plans have achieved similar market dominance in numerous localities.  Id. at 5.  For 
example, Blue Cross has attained a market share of 57% in Philadelphia, Highmark has a 
marker share of 66.4% and controls 96% of the HMO market in Pittsburgh, and Blue Cross 
Blue Shield controls approximately 50% of the market in Rhode Island.  Id. 
5Francis Achampong, The McCaran-Ferguson Act and the Limited Insurance Antitrust 
Exemption:  An Indefensible Aberation?, 15 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 141 (1991); see generally  
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Ferguson Act.6  This legislation served to provide insurance companies with a 
limited exemption from federal antitrust laws, to the extent that their activity is 
covered by state law.7  However, this exemption does not shield insurance companies 
from federal prosecution for acts that traditionally constitute violations of federal 
antitrust law, such as boycotts, coercion, or intimidation.8  
The Supreme Court has established a three-part test for determining whether the 
actions of an insurance company should be construed as part of the “business of 
insurance,” and, therefore, exempt from antitrust liability under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.9  This three-part standard requires the reviewing court to determine: 
first, whether the activity transfers or spreads the insured’s risk; second, whether the 
activity is an essential or integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer 
and insured; and third, whether the activity or practice is limited to members within 
the insurance field.10  Challenges to the states’ power to regulate and tax insurance 
companies under the Commerce Clause following the enactment of this statute were 
rejected and the right of the several states to regulate insurance was affirmed.11 
This industry friendly legislation has justifiably received some criticism.  As 
previously stated, the McCarran-Ferguson Act only applies to the insurance business, 
providing insurance companies with statutory immunity under the federal antitrust 
laws not granted to any other major industry.12  However, there does not seem to be 
any valid reason why the insurance industry should enjoy this unique preferential 
treatment. 
It arguable that this exemption actually serves to restrict competition by allowing 
for data sharing and concerted rate determination.  This legislation also opens the 
door to possible collective raising of rates or premiums.  The added leverage that the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act provides insurance companies over individual health care 
providers and patients has also been noticed by many members of Congress, 
evidenced by the listing of this effect of the Act in the findings of Congress in the 
                                                          
SEC v. Nat’l Sec. Inc., 343 U.S. 453 (1980); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 
440 U.S. 205 (1979). 
6McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 
(1988)). 
7§ 1013(a).  Section 1012(b) provides that “no Act of Congress shall be construed to 
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the 
business of insurance, . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of 
insurance. . . .”  § 1012(b). 
8§ 1013(b).  (providing that “(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render said Sherman 
Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate or act of boycott, coersion 
or intimidation. . .”). 
9See Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 440 U.S. at 229-30. 
10Id. 
11See generally FTC v. Travelers Health Ass’n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960); Wilburn Boat Co. v. 
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 
(1954); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
12See Achampong, supra note 5, at 141.  
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recently proposed bill referred to as the Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999.13  
Essentially, the McCarran-Ferguson Act unnecessarily provides added bargaining 
power, though limited, to insurance companies, thereby further hampering 
physicians in contract negotiations.  
II.  OPPOSITION TO UNIONIZATION OF PHYSICIANS   
A.  Basis For Antitrust Liability 
To date, attempts by independent physicians to pool together to lessen this 
imbalance of power within the health care industry have been met by strong 
resistance.  A principle argument of those opposed to such efforts seems to be that 
such a unionization of doctors would serve to stifle competition within the health 
care arena, fattening the pockets of already overpaid physicians and yet not 
significantly improving the quality of care provided to patients.  Fear of striking 
physicians and the resulting unavailability of medical services, particularly 
emergency care, undoubtedly to greatly fuel the opposition.  Accordingly, 
physicians’ efforts to unite for collective bargaining purposes have been viciously 
attacked as violations of the antitrust laws. 
The free trade and unrestrained competition are central to American capitalism, 
and have led to the development and staunch enforcement of the antitrust laws.14  
The Supreme Court of the United States has maintained that faith in the value of 
competition is at the heart of our national economic policy15 and described the 
antitrust laws as the “Magna Carta of free enterprise.”16  These laws reflect the 
widely accepted belief that competition generally serves to promote the efficient 
allocation of resources, enabling consumers to have access to the highest quality 
goods and services at the lowest possible prices.17  The antitrust laws are also 
generally thought to ensure greater freedom of choice in the market, promoting 
increased quality, service, safety, durability, and immediate cost.18  Consumer 
preferences, rather than a competitor’s abuse of market power, are intended to 
control the success or failure of one’s business.19 
                                                                
13See Suhail Khan, H.R. 1304: Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999, at 
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query>.  
14See Nancy K. Whittemore, Antitrust Enforcement and Health Care Reform, 32 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1493 (1996).  The United States Supreme Court has gone as far as to analogize the 
relationship between the antitrust laws and the preservation of economic freedom and the free-
enterprise system to the Bill of Rights and the protection of personal freedom.  United States 
v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
15Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951). 
16Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596. 
17See David L. Meyer & Charles F. Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not Require 
Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169 (1994); see also Nat’l Soc’y of 
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
18Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695. 
19See Antitrust Issues in the Health Care Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Medicare and Long-Term Care of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong. 66 (1993) 
[hereinafter “Antitrust Hearings”]. 
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Ironically, the antitrust laws were intended to help entrepreneurs compete on a 
level playing field by condemning anti-competitive behavior.20  However, today they 
serve as ammunition against private practitioners within health care, actually 
preventing them from having the opportunity to compete on the same level as the 
insurance companies and HMOs, which have come to dominate the industry.  
Antitrust liability was originally a common law concept but has since been 
codified and thereby incorporated into positive law.21  The principal federal antitrust 
statutes are the Sherman Act of 1890,22 the Clayton Act,23 enacted in 1914 and 
substantially amended by the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936,24 and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1914.25 
The Sherman Act serves to make contracts, combinations or conspiracies in 
restraint of trade, void at common law, unlawful in the positive sense.26  It also 
created a civil cause of action for damages in favor of those injured by the actions of 
another party that violate its provisions.27  The act is commonly employed to prevent 
or estop agreements to fix prices,28 conspiracies amongst competitors to boycott 
other parties,29 and the use of coercion to restrain open competition.30   
                                                                
20Id. at 70. 
21Combinations in restraint of trade or tending to create or maintain monopoly gave rise to 
actions at common law.  Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 244 F.2d 471 (D.C. 
Cir. 1957); see also Mans v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Okla. 1971) 
(providing that federal statutory law on monopolies did not supplant common law but 
incorporated it). 
2215 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).  
23§§ 12-27.  
24The Robinson-Patman Act amended the Clayton Act and added §§ 13a, 13b, and 21a to 
title 15.  Paceco, Inc. v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 468 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. 
Cal. 1979). 
2515 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994). 
26Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962).  Section One 
of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part that: “(e)very contract, combination the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is hereby declared to be 
illegal.”  15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).  Section Two of the Act further provides that: “(e)very person 
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty 
of a felony. . . .”  § 2. 
27See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978).  
28See, e.g.,  Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (holding that 
agreements among doctors that established the maximum fees to be claimed as payment for 
particular services rendered amounted to an illegal price-fixing conspiracy prohibited by the 
Sherman Act); Goldfarb v.Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (finding that the establishment 
of a minimum fee schedule, published by the county bar association and enforced by the state 
bar, constituted illegal price-fixing). 
29See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.1984) (holding the denial of staff 
privileges to osteopathic physicians by the staff of Weiss Hospital constituted a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
496 U.S. 982 (1990) (finding that the boycott of chiropractic physicians by the American 
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The elements that must be proven to establish a claim under the Sherman Act are: 
a contract, combination or conspiracy; which unreasonably restrained trade under the 
per se rule of illegality or rule of reason analysis; and affected interstate commerce 
or injured competition.31  It is also necessary that the plaintiff be able to demonstrate 
that the injury to his business or property was the direct result of the defendants’ 
actions in restraint of trade, and said damages must be reasonably ascertainable and 
not merely speculative.32  
The Clayton Act is geared more toward preventing the development of unfair 
market conditions that serve to foster monopolies or deter competition.33  The United 
States Supreme Court has interpreted the congressional intent underlining this Act, 
stating that through enactment of this section, Congress  
sought generally to obviate price discrimination practices threatening 
independent merchants and businessmen, presumably, from whatever 
source, and intended to assure, to the extent reasonably practicable, that 
businessmen at the same functional level would start on equal competitive 
footing so far as price was concerned.34  
The Act focuses upon several types of restraints of trade, including exclusive 
dealing arrangements and price discriminations, and provides a civil remedy for 
                                                          
Medical Association amounted to unreasonable restraint of trade forbidden under Section One 
of the Sherman Act).  
30See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (finding that the policy 
adhered to by the members of the Indiana Federation of Dentists of refusing to relinquish x-
rays to insurers established an unreasonable restraint of trade prohibited by the Sherman Act). 
31Spence v. S.E. Alaska Pilots’ Ass’n, 789 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Alaska 1992).  See also 
Mowery v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 463 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aff’d 590 F.2d 335 
(6th Cir. 1978); Unibrand Tire & Prod. Co., Inc. v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 429 F. Supp. 470 
(W.D.N.Y. 1977); N. C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 85 F.R.D. 
249 (M.D.N.C. 1979); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. 
Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981). 
32Wilder Enter., Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1980).  See 
also Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1980), on remand 501 F. Supp. 
155 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Sun Dun, Inc. of Wash. v. Coca-Cola Co., 740 F. Supp. 381 (D. Md. 
1990).  
33FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).  See also FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 
U.S. 536 (1960), on remand 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961) (providing that the Clayton Act, 
which serves to forbid price discriminations where the effect may be to substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, was originally enacted to 
curb use by financially powerful corporations of localized price-cutting tactics that impaired 
competitive position of other sellers).  See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994).  Section 13 of 
the Act provides in pertinent follows: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in 
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in 
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality. . . .”  § 13(a).  In 
addition, § 13(f) provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the 
course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is 
prohibited by this section.”  § 13(f). 
34FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, reh’g denied 364 U.S. 854 (1960).  See also 
Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962). 
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those injured by parties who violate it.35  Essentially, this legislation was enacted to 
curb and prohibit all devices through which large buyers gained discriminatory 
preferences over smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power.36 
While not identical to the Sherman Act, the tests for illegality under these two 
Acts are complementary.37  The principle distinction between the two is that the 
Sherman Act makes illegal monopolies and agreements in restraint of trade that have 
already manifested themselves fully, while the Clayton Act serves to strike down 
discriminatory and anti-competitive practices at their incipiency, before they have 
had the opportunity to reach the dimensions of Sherman Act violations.38  
In 1936, the Clayton Act was significantly altered by the Robinson-Patman Act.39  
The Robinson-Patman is generally thought to be a response to perceived increases in 
market power and coercive practices by large purchasers or buying groups over their 
smaller independent competitors.40  The primary purpose of the Act seems to be to 
protect independent business persons by eliminating the competitive advantages of 
larger market entities that result from their superior purchasing power.41  Unlike 
actions under the Sherman Act, in which it need only be demonstrated that the 
transactions complained of have affected interstate commerce, to successfully bring a 
claim under the Robinson-Patman Act, it is necessary to allege and prove that the 
actions in restraint of trade complained of are actually in interstate commerce.42 
Although on its face the Robinson-Patman Act might appear to be the ideal 
mechanism through which independent physicians might be able to combat the 
market dominance and competitive advantages of HMOs and insurance companies, 
to date, it has not been an effective means to achieve that end. 
Finally, the Federal Trade Commission Act serves as a catch-all enactment for 
antitrust regulation.  It empowers the FTC to enforce the antitrust laws embodied in 
the aforementioned Acts and, essentially, fills the gaps left open by the seemingly 
                                                                
35See Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166. 
36Id. 
37See United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (providing that §§ 1-7 
and 12-27 of this title do not embody inconsistent policy approaches and are not unrelated to 
each other, but tests of illegality under such sections are complementary). 
38See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see also 
United States Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304 (S.D. Mich. 1951), aff’d 343 U.S. 444 (1952) 
(maintaining that §§ 12-27 of this title aim to strike down a monopoly at its inception, when 
the first step is taken, and §§ 1-7 of this title aim to strike down a monopoly after it has 
become more virile).  
39See FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968); Nat’l Dairy Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 395 
F.2d 517 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 393 U.S. 977 (1968); Lago & Sons Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood, 
Inc., 892 F. Supp. 325 (D.N.H. 1995), reconsideration  granted 937 F. Supp. 107 (1996). 
40Yeager's Fuel, Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 953 F. Supp. 617 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
41See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., 360 U.S. 55, reh’g denied 361 U.S. 855 (1959) 
(holding that the Robinson-Patman Act was enacted to eliminate inequities resulting from 
competitive advantages obtained by large purchasers from special services or facilities).  
42See Lewis v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ill. 1943); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Blade, 110 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Cal. 1953), appeal dismissed sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Metro. Engravers, Ltd., 245 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1956). 
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more explicit regulatory statutes described above.43  The Act also makes it unlawful 
to engage in unfair methods of competition or deceptive practices in or affecting 
commerce.44  Much like all of the aforementioned antitrust legislation, the Act seems 
to be directed primarily toward combating the evils thought to be associated with 
conspiracies in restraint of trade and monopolization.   
B.  Enforcement of Antitrust Laws 
The federal antitrust laws are primarily enforced by the FTC and the antitrust 
division of the DOJ, though private parties can also bring actions under those 
provisions.45  In applying these laws to the facts of a particular case, the actions of 
the entity in question are either determined to be per se violations or are analyzed 
under what is referred to as the “rule of reason.”46  Agreements among competitors 
that clearly serve to fix prices or allocate markets are generally deemed to be per se 
illegal.47  This per se rule is enforced uniformly across all forms of industry48 and is 
not rendered inapplicable simply because the alleged justification for the agreement 
in question is to promote competition.49  Similarly, economic justifications for the 
fixing of prices or arguments that the established prices are reasonable, or even 
beneficial to consumers, will not serve to protect a given party from liability.50  One 
might be surprised to learn that the per se rule has even served to invalidate price-
                                                                
4315 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994).  Section 41 of the this Act provides in pertinent part as 
follows: “A commission is created and established, to be known as the Federal Trade 
Commission. . . .”  § 41. 
44§ 45(a)(1).  See also Antitrust Hearings, supra note 19, at 66 (prepared statement of 
James C. Egan, Jr.). 
45See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 12-27, 41-58 (1994). 
46See generally ROBERT KLEIN, DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM’N STATEMENTS 
OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996). 
47See United States v. Socony-Vaccuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 213 (1940) (holding that 
any combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, 
pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal 
per se under the Sherman Act); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980). 
48Socony-Vaccuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222.  See also  Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med’l 
Soc’y, 643 F.2d 563, 564 (9th Cir. 1982) (expressing that there is nothing in the nature of the 
medical profession or the health care industry in general that would warrant their exemption 
from per se rules for price fixing); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778 (1975); Nat’l 
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 696. 
49Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332. 
50See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1890), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1898); Nat’l Soc’y 
of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 689 (rejecting the argument that competitors may lawfully agree 
to sell their goods at an established price so long as the agreed-upon price is reasonable); 
Catalano, Inc., 446 U.S. at 647; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, at 226 (maintaining 
that all price-fixing agreements are banned, regardless of their justification, because of their 
actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy). 
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fixing agreements that established the maximum fees to be charged for particular 
services.51  
The per se rule has also been employed to invalidate agreements made between 
groups of physicians.52  A noteworthy example of this is Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Medical Society, a case involving alleged price-fixing agreements that was reviewed 
by the United States Supreme Court.53  In Maricopa County, the member doctors of 
the Maricopa County Medical Society in Arizona made an agreement through which 
they established the maximum fees that could be charged for specific health services 
rendered to policy holders of specified insurance plans.54  The Court found that this 
agreement violated the per se rule because it constituted a price restraint that 
provided for the same economic rewards for all practitioners, regardless of their 
relative skill, experience, training, or willingness to engage in novel medical 
procedures.55  It also speculated that this type of agreement could serve to discourage 
entry of competitors into the market and might deter experimentation and new 
developments within the industry.56  This case demonstrates the real potential that 
agreements made between physicians concerning the fees to be charged for particular 
services rendered will be found violative of the antitrust laws. 
Currently, most alleged agreements in restraint of trade seem to be analyzed 
under the rule of reason.  Under this approach, it is possible for some agreements 
which actually do result in limited restraint of trade to still be found to be valid, even 
though they might justifiably be classified as per se violations of the antitrust laws.57  
In analyzing a particular agreement, the court first attempts to determine whether the 
formation and operation of the joint venture or network in question has a substantial 
anti-competitive effect.58  If it is found to have such an effect, that potential impact is 
then weighed against any pro-competitive efficiencies which might result 
therefrom.59  Legality, therefore, rests to a great extent upon whether the restraint 
imposed is such that it merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, 
or whether it serves to suppress or even destroy competition.  
In making such a determination, the court ordinarily considers numerous factors.  
Among those factors most often reviewed are: the specific facts peculiar to the 
business in question, the condition of the relevant market before the alleged restraint 
was introduced, and the nature of the restraint in question and its actual or probable 
effect on the market.60  Agreements, or express or implied contracts, that are found to 
                                                                
51Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 345.  See also Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. 
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Albreckt v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
52See, e.g., Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332. 
53Id. 
54Id. at 335. 
55Id. at 348. 
56Id. 
57See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
58See KLEIN, supra note 46, at 66. 
59Id. 
60Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
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be likely to produce significant efficiencies that benefit consumers and any pricing 
agreements determined to be reasonably necessary to realize those efficiencies, will 
most likely be found to be legal under the rule of reason.61  The key for physicians, 
therefore, is to persuasively demonstrate that their particular agreements or networks 
actually serve to create a benefit to the consumer that outweighs the detriment 
resulting from any restraint of competition.62  Therein lies another substantial 
obstacle to physician unionization. 
C.  Limited Labor Exemption 
While the federal antitrust laws generally serve to prohibit agreements that are in 
restraint of trade, a limited exception has been established that enables employees to 
organize for contract bargaining purposes in a manner that would technically violate 
such laws.  This was principally achieved through the enactment of the National 
Labor Relations Act [hereinafter “NLRA”] in 1935.63  This legislation was enacted in 
response to the perceived inequality of bargaining power between employees and 
their employers.64  It sought to level the playing field by conferring certain 
affirmative rights on employees and by placing certain enumerated restrictions on the 
activities of employers.65  
The fundamental purpose of the NLRA has been described as to promote 
industrial peace and stability by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining.66  The manifest objective to be obtained through collective bargaining67 
                                                                
61Id. 
62KLEIN, supra note 46, at 64. 
6329 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).  The Act serves to create the National Labor Relations 
Board and empowers it to: “prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice 
affecting consumers.”  § 160. 
64See Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that this 
subchapter was designed to overcome the inequality of bargaining power between employees 
and employers). 
65See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).  
66See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Bloom v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 
1015 (5th Cir. 1979) (maintaining that the intent of the Act is to minimize industrial strife and 
to promote industrial stability through collective bargaining); NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage 
Warehouse Co., 424 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that the purpose of this subchapter is to 
promote settlement of labor disputes through collective bargaining); NLRB v. Air Control 
Prods. of St. Petersburg, Inc., 335 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1964) (maintaining that this subchapter is 
designed to facilitate industrial peace through encouraging collective bargaining); NLRB v. 
Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding that the fundamental policy 
of this subchapter is to encourage collective bargaining and the industrial stability flowing 
therefrom); Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973).  
67Collective bargaining is defined by the Act as:  
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the 
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
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is the formation of binding contracts between employees and labor organizations.68  
To facilitate this collective bargaining, the NLRA allows for employees to unite and 
to select a union, by majority vote, that will serve as their bargaining 
representative.69  However, by safeguarding the right of employees to engage in 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, Congress did not intend 
to weaken the underlying contractual bonds and loyalties between employers and 
employees.70  On the contrary, the underlying purpose of the Act is to strengthen, 
rather than weaken, the cooperation and functional relationship between the 
employer and the employed.71  In reviewing the purpose of the NLRA, the United 
States Supreme Court has stated that,  
[this subchapter] is aimed at encouraging the practice and procedure of 
collective bargaining and at protecting the exercise by workers of full 
freedom of association, of self-organization, and of negotiating the terms 
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection 
through their freely chosen representatives.72 
Section 157 of the NLRA specifically defines the right of employees to organize 
and bargain collectively, stating in pertinent part: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and 
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except 
to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring 
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as 
authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.73 
                                                          
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). 
68NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).  See also NLRB v. Scullin Steel Co., 
161 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1947); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 
1943); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).  See also  H.K. Porter Co. 
v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (stating that one of the fundamental policies of the NLRA is 
freedom of contract). 
69Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138 (1979).  See also  NLRB v. Milk 
Drivers and Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976) (maintaining that this 
subchapter was designed to permit workers to freely exercise the right to join unions, to be 
active or passive members, or to abstain from joining any union at all without imperiling their 
right to a livelihood). 
70NLRB v. Knuth Bros., Inc., 537 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1976).  
71Id. 
72NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F.2d 262, cert. denied 314 U.S. 693 (1941).  
See also S.S. Pennock Co. v. Ferretti, 201 Misc. 563 (N.Y. 1951), rev’d 128 N.Y.S.2d 749 
(1954), 283 A.D. 527 (1954), motion dismissed 286 A.D. 964 (1955) (arising in New York in 
which the purpose of this subchapter was identified as to encourage the practice and procedure 
of collective bargaining, and to protect the exercise by employees of full freedom of 
association, organization and designation of representatives of their own choosing).  
7329 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). 
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This statute was essentially meant to level the playing field within the labor 
market by granting employees whatever advantage they would get from collective 
pressure upon their employer.74  It was hoped that the Act would serve to eliminate 
the ability of employers to use brute force to dominate labor disputes.75   
In light of the underlying philosophy of the NLRA and its express purpose of 
facilitating collective bargaining, one might logically assume that the Act would 
serve to insulate independent physicians from antitrust liability when they attempt to 
unite for the purposes of collective bargaining.  However, the myriad of instances 
arising throughout the United States in which this issue has been addressed seem to 
demonstrate that this is simply not the case.  The principle obstacle for physicians 
has been their inability to be classified as an appropriate bargaining unit by the 
National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter “Board” or “NLRB”], and thus afforded 
protection under the NLRA.  
Under the NLRA, once a specific group has been certified by the Board as an 
appropriate bargaining unit, the group’s employer becomes obligated to negotiate 
with unit representatives in good faith.76  These bargaining units are referred to in the 
statutory language as “labor organizations.”77  In establishing the appropriateness of 
such a unit, the Board seems to focus primarily upon whether or not the employees 
of the unit can establish a discernable “community-of-interests.”78  This 
“community-of-interests” can be demonstrated by similarities amongst members of 
the group in regards to such things as the extent of interaction with other employees, 
wages, working hours, and the extent of common supervision.79  Although the 
language of the Act and relevant case law has helped to identify the characteristics of 
bargaining groups required by the Board for certification as an appropriate 
bargaining unit, analysis must still be made on a case-by-case-basis. 
                                                                
74Art Metals Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1940). 
75NLRB v. Del.-N.J. Ferry Co., 90 F.2d 520 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 302 U.S. 738 (1937). 
76See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994); see also NLRB v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 120 F.2d 
1004 (3d Cir. 1941) (providing that this subchapter manifests intent that employer bargain 
collectively in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of 
employment, and “good faith” essential to the bargaining function is rendered impossible 
where employer has foreclosed in advance any possibility of agreement); E.I. Du Pont De 
Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied 313 U.S. 571 (1941) 
(finding that the Act’s fundamental purpose is fulfilled when it is established that the employer 
acted in genuine good faith). 
77See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994) (“The term ‘labor organization’ means any organization 
of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees 
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 
concerning grievances, labor  disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or 
conditions of work.”). 
78John Robert Shelton, NLRB Guidelines for Determining Health Care Indus. Bargaining 
Units: Judicial Acceptance or Back to the Drawing Board, 78 KY. L.J. 143, 150 (1990).  See 
also Leigh Anne Flavin, The Thomas-Davis Cases: The Appropriateness of Physicians as 
Bargaining Units and the Possible Implications for Insurance Companies Under the National 
Labor Relations Act, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 811 (1998). 
79Id.  See also Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 239 NLRB 872, 873 (1978); Shelton, supra note 78, 
at 150-51. 
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In 1989, the NLRB greatly clarified this issue by exercising its substantial rule-
making authority and actually listed the types of bargaining units within the health 
care industry that it deemed to be appropriate.80  The validity of this rule, and the 
Board’s authority to create it, have been upheld by the United States Supreme 
Court.81  While physicians are listed among the eight enumerated combinations of 
appropriate bargaining units under this rule, groups of independent practitioners are 
not necessarily protected.  
To be insulated from antitrust liability by the NLRA, independent physicians 
must be classified as members of the class intended to be protected by the Act, 
specifically that of the employee.82  This protected class has been described as 
working men in crafts and unskilled labor.83  It was hoped that the enactment of this 
legislation would enable employees to bargain collectively, so that they might be 
able to attain adequate wages for services rendered, fair working conditions, and job 
security.84 
The express language of the NLRA confirms that it was designed primarily to 
protect “employees” and “professional employees.”85  It also specifically excludes 
                                                                
80See 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1998).  Section 103.30 provides in pertinent part as follows:  
Except in extraordinary circumstances and in circumstances where there are existing 
non-conforming units, the following shall be the appropriate units, and the only 
appropriate units, for petitions filed pursuant to section 9(c)(1)(A)(i) or 9(c)(1)(B) of 
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, except that, if sought by labor 
organizations, various combinations of units may be appropriate: 
 (1) All registered nurses. 
 (2) All physicians.   
 (3) All professionals except for registered nurses and physicians. 
 (4) All technical employees. 
 (5) All skilled maintenance employees. 
 (6) All business office clerical employees. 
 (7) All guards. 
 (8) All nonprofessional employees except for technical employees, skilled 
maintenance employees, business office clerical employees, and guards.  Provided that 
a unit of five or fewer employees shall constitute an extraordinary circumstance. 
 (b) Where extraordinary circumstances exist, the Board shall determine 
appropriate units by adjudication. 
Id. (emphasis added) 
81See Evans v. Am. Fed’n of Television and Radio Artists, 354 F. Supp. 823, 847 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev’d on other grounds 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 




85See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1994).  Section 152(3) provides: 
The term “employee” shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the 
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, 
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in 
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and 
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but 
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic 
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several enumerated classes of individuals, including independent contractors and 
supervisors.86  Unfortunately for private practitioners, the nature of their profession is 
such that they are often classified as either independent contractors or supervisors.87  
As a result, they are often not included within the protected class of the 
“employee.”88   
Although independently practicing physicians have traditionally been classified 
as independent contractors, such a determination is not automatic.89  Case law in this 
area demonstrates that physicians can, in some instances, be deemed to be 
employees, warranting of antitrust protection.90  The Board, as well as reviewing 
courts, consider a variety of factors in determining whether an individual should be 
classified as an employee or an independent contractor, including common law 
agency principles and the decision-making authority and relative autonomy of the 
individual in question.91  As such, employee status must be determined on a case-by-
case basis.   
While the employee requirement of the NLRA has proved to be a prohibitive 
barrier for most physicians seeking to unite for collective bargaining purposes, 
proponents of physicians unions have attempted to challenge the traditional 
classification of physicians as independent contractors.92  For example, in 1998, 
representatives of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union successfully 
convinced the Board to reconsider the employment status of several hundred 
                                                          
service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent 
or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any 
individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer 
subject to the Railway Labor Act [§ 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.], as amended from time to 
time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.   
§ 152(3) (emphasis added).  Section 152(12) provides: 
The term “professional employee” means— 
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in 
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; 
(ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; 
(iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be 
standardized in relation to a given period of time;  (iv) requiring knowledge of an 
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged 
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher 
learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an 
apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or 
physical processes. 
§ 152(12)(a). 
86See generally, Vizciano v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996). 
87See Shelton, supra note 78. 
88Id. 
89Id. (finding that freelancing professionals who though they were independent contractors 
were actually employees). 
90See Flavin, supra note 78, at 828. 
91Id. 
92Id. 
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independent physicians in New Jersey.93  The Board Chairman ordered a full hearing 
to determine the employee or independent contractor status of the physicians, 
stressing that every aspect of the relationship between the alleged employee and the 
alleged employer should be considered.94  The Board looked beyond the mere 
contractual relationship between the parties and seemed to place significant emphasis 
upon the amount of control exercised over access to patients.95  The rationale 
employed by the Board in this case seems to suggest that the barrier to collective 
bargaining by independent physicians, embodied in the employee requirement of the 
NLRA, might be beginning to deteriorate. 
The NLRA, as it was originally enacted, did not exclude supervisors96 from the 
class of individuals potentially deserving of protection under the Act.97  Accordingly, 
the Board initially allowed for supervisors to be counted in the class of employees.98  
However, the Board soon developed a realization of the substantial differences 
between the interests, roles, and duties of supervisors and those of employees.99  In 
1947, Congress amended the Act to expressly exclude “supervisors” from its 
protection.100  As such, even those physicians who manage to escape classification as 
an independent contractor, could be, and quite often are, determined to be 
“supervisors” for purposes of the NLRA, and therefore barred from its antitrust 
protection. 
III.  WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
It should be clear from the analysis of the federal antitrust laws above, that the 
cards are substantially stacked against independently practicing physicians who wish 
to unite to collectively bargain with insurance providers and managed care 
organizations.  Our emphasis must now turn to what must be done to remedy this 
situation without running afoul of the antitrust laws. 
Several options seem to present themselves.  Doctors could simply resign to 
being labeled as independent contractors or supervisors and continue to be bullied by 
                                                                
93Id. 
94See NLRB: Divided NLRB Orders Full Hearing on UFCW Petition for HMO Physicians, 
174 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Sept. 9, 1998. 
95See id.; see also AmeriHealth Inc., 362 NLRB No. 55 (1998). 
96The term “supervisor” as defined by the NLRA includes: “. . . any individual having 
authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, 
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to 
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the 
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but 
requires the use of independent judgment.”  29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994). 
97See Christopher J. Lawhorn, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.: One Less 
Hurdle to Finding “Supervisor” Status, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 619 (1995). 
98See In re Codchaux Sugars, 44 NLRB 874 (1942); In re Unio Colliers Coal Co., 41 
NLRB 961 (1942). 
99See In re Colonial Press, 50 NLRB 823 (1943); In re Maryland Drydock Co., 49 NLRB 
733 (1943). 
10029 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994). 
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insurance companies and HMOs.  They might alternatively pray for Big Brother to 
step in and establish a national health care system fully regulated by the federal 
government.  However, neither of these options seem very desirable.   
Instead, physicians could adopt a more proactive approach.  One possible option 
would be to attempt to structure their bargaining alliances in such a way that they 
comport to the limited latitude afforded by the antitrust laws and the enforcement 
policy of the FTC and DOJ.  Alternatively, relief for physicians might be provided 
through the enactment of new legislation, either at the state or federal level, which 
expressly provides for antitrust exemptions for groups of independently practicing 
physicians.  Among three viable options, the interests of all affected parties would 
best be served through the enactment of federal legislation, as the federal preemption 
over state law will prove to establish relative uniformity of enforcement throughout 
the country. 
A.  Viable Option 1:  Attempt to Comply With Current Antitrust Laws 
Simple solutions quite often turn out to be the best ones.  Accordingly, a very 
logical and reasonable means through which physicians might legally improve their 
bargaining positions would be to simply design their particular bargaining alliances 
in accordance with the limited leeway allotted by the antitrust laws and their primary 
enforcers.  Considerable guidance for such efforts can be found in the Statement of 
Antitrust Enforcement Policy issued by the DOJ and FTC in August of 1996.101  
The 1996 Policy Statement specifically addresses physician organizations, 
referred to therein as “physician network joint ventures,” and identifies the 
characteristics of the types of groups with which the DOJ and FTC will likely not 
interfere.102  The statement provides that, in the absence of extraordinary 
circumstances, neither agency will interfere with exclusive physician network joint 
ventures103 whose physician participants share substantial financial risk, and 
comprise no more than twenty percent of the physicians within each specialty having 
active staff privileges and practicing within a given geographic market.104  Similarly, 
in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, both agencies will refrain from 
challenging non-exclusive physician network joint ventures105 where the physician 
participants share substantial financial risk and constitute no more than thirty percent 
of the physicians from each specialty with active staff privileges practicing within a 
given geographic market.106  These types of physicians groups are described by the 
agencies as functioning within antitrust “safety zones.”107   
The Policy Statement justifies the risk-sharing requirement common to both of 
the aforementioned antitrust “safety zones” by maintaining that such a requirement 
provides physicians with an incentive to cooperate in controlling costs and 
                                                                





106KLEIN, supra note 46. 
107Id. 
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improving the quality of care that they provide.108  These “safety zones” are not 
absolute, however, and physician groups that do not conform perfectly to their basic 
requirements might yet be found to be unlawful.109  Physicians intending to form 
these types of organizations can actually obtain advisory opinions from the FTC, or 
business reviews from the DOJ, prior to establishing their proposed union, by 
submitting specified information to those agencies.110  As such, not only do 
physicians have the agencies’ Policy Statement to serve as a guide, but they also 
have the option of submitting proposals to the agencies in advance so that they might 
be able to rectify any potential problems prior to any legal proceeding. 
The most recent case law dealing with this issue demonstrates that the two most 
readily available means through which physicians groups can engage in some degree 
of collaborative negotiating without violating the antitrust laws are either to obtain 
approval from the DOJ to operate a “Qualified Managed Care Plan” [hereinafter 
“QMPC”] or to adopt what is referred to as a “messenger model” approach.111  To 
receive approval to operate as a QMPC, a physicians group must essentially comply 
with the DOJ Policy Statement discussed above.112  While there seems to be some 
variance in the particular requirements from case to case, the essential characteristics 
of acceptable physicians groups include the sharing of substantial risk by the 
member physicians and comprising a small proportion of the relevant market, 
typically no more than thirty percent. 
The term “messenger model” refers to a means through which groups of 
independent physicians can jointly market their services to managed care 
providers.113  This approach basically involves employing a third party to act as a sort 
of go-between, facilitating the exchange of information between individual 
physicians and those who purchase their services.114  This approach does not, 
however, allow for collective negotiations or any other collusive behavior of that 
sort.115  It simply provides a means through which managed care providers can gain 
access, through the third party “messenger,” to the fees which individual doctors are 
willing to accept for the performance of a particular service, without having to deal 
directly with each individual physician.116  The third party serves to benefit the 




111KLEIN, supra note 46. 
112Id. 
113Id. 
114See generally Dep’t of Justice Notice in re United States v. Woman’s Hosp. Found., 61 
Fed. Reg. 43380-02 (Aug. 22, 1996); Dep’t of Justice Notice in re United States v. Health 
Care Partners, Inc., 60 Fed.Reg. 52014-01 (Oct. 4, 1995); Dep’t of Justice Notice in re United 
States v. Health Choice of Mo., Inc., 60 Fed. Reg. 51808-02 (Oct. 3, 1995) [hereinafter, 
collectively “Dep’t of Justice Notices”]. 
115See Dep’t of Justice Notices, supra note 114. 
116Id. 
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physicians, in turn, by marketing their services and accepting offers from MCPs on 
their behalf that fall within a predetermined range of acceptable fees.117   
While designing physicians organizations in accordance with the leeway allotted 
by the antitrust laws is a viable option, legislative intervention would be preferable.  
The guidance provided by the language of the antitrust statutes, relevant case law, 
and the Policy Statement of the DOJ and FTC, while helpful, is not clear or definite 
enough for physicians to be able to decipher and rely upon when creating collective 
bargaining units.  There is still room in the law for subjective interpretation and 
analysis of factual considerations, both of which tend to lead to litigation.  The 
enactment of a clear and definitive statutory provision, on the other hand, would 
greatly simplify this area of the law, providing physicians with the requisite guidance 
to establish legal bargaining groups and potentially reducing the amount of litigation 
in this area. 
B.  Viable Option 2:  Let the Individual States Handle the Problem 
It is arguable that the evils currently inherent to the health care industry could 
best be remedied through state action, rather than through federal intervention.  
Many state legislatures have already taken the initiative and begun to propose, and in 
some cases to enact, new legislation geared toward bridging the gap among 
physicians and managed care providers and insurance companies.118  Such efforts are 
undoubtedly motivated in no small part by the lobbying efforts of local medical 
associations. 
Texas has recently adopted legislation that enables individual physicians to join 
to negotiate with managed care providers under the supervision of the State.119  On 
June 20, 1999, Texas Governor George W. Bush signed Senate Bill 1468, often 
referred to as the “Physician Negotiation Bill,” stating that it would serve to level the 
playing field between independent physicians and managed care organizations when 
it comes to determining the quality of care for patients.120  Proponents of this Bill 
                                                                
117Id. 
118See generally TIM MAGLIONE, MEMORANDUM TO OSMA COUNCIL: TEXAS “STATE 
ACTION” LEGISLATION (1999). 
119Id. 
1201999 Legislative Compendium: Market Fairness/Managed Care Reform, at 
<http:www.texmed.org> [hereinafter “1999 Legislative Compendium”].  TEX. INS. CODE ANN. 
§ 29.01 provides as follows: 
The legislature finds that joint negotiation by competing physicians of certain terms 
and conditions of contracts with health plans will result in pro-competitive effects in 
the absence of any express or implied threat of retaliatory joint action, such as a 
boycott or strike, by physicians.  Although the legislature finds that joint negotiations 
over fee-related terms may in some circumstances yield anticompetitive effects, it also 
recognizes that there are instances in which health plans dominate the market to such a 
degree that fair negotiations between physicians and the plan are unobtainable absent 
any joint action on behalf of physicians.  In these instances, health plans have the 
ability to virtually dictate the terms of the contracts they offer physicians.  
Consequently, the legislature finds it appropriate and necessary to authorize joint 
negotiations on fee-related and other issues where it determines that such imbalances 
exist. 
§ 29.01.  
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maintain that it will allow physicians to better protect their own rights, as well as 
those of their patients.121  Since this new legislation was only recently enacted, no 
significant conclusions can yet be made concerning its effects upon the health care 
community within that state or the quality of care received by its citizens.  However, 
it is likely that this novel legislation will have a considerable impact upon not only 
Texas, but upon other states that might now attempt to pursue similar legislation in 
hopes of restoring fairness health care. 
This newly enacted statute is codified in Chapter 29 of the Texas Insurance Code, 
as “Joint Negotiations by Physicians with Health Benefit Plans.”122  It permits 
individual, competing physicians to collectively negotiate with managed care 
organizations so long as the group of physicians does not comprise more than ten 
percent of the physicians in the health plan’s service area or dominate a particular 
medical specialty.123  The physicians are to designate a third party to represent their 
interests in the negotiations, during which time the health benefit plans maintain the 
right to make offers to, or even enter into contracts with other competing individual 
physicians.124  However, before the negotiations can even commence, the parties 
must receive the approval of the state attorney general, who must review the request 
for joint negotiations to ensure that it is reasonable and that the likely benefits of 
such negotiations will not be outweighed by any harm caused by the reduction of 
competition.125  Physicians are also somewhat limited as to with whom they are 
permitted to negotiate.126  Public managed care plans, such as Medicaid, for example, 
are outside of the scope of parties subject to this statute.127   
Perhaps one of the most attractive aspects of this Texas statute is its inherent 
safeguards, which should prove to prevent physicians from abusing their newly 
granted power to jointly negotiate contract terms.  Initially, the attorney general must 
determine that the health benefit plan with which the group of physicians intends to 
negotiate maintains substantial market power in a service area and has the capacity to 
adversely affect the quality and availability of patient care.128  Further, physician 
groups are prohibited from negotiating certain contract terms, such as the fees or 
prices for services, the amount of any discounts to be granted on services rendered, 
and the dollar amount of capitation129 or fixed payment for health services rendered 
                                                                
121See David Koenig, Texas Takes the Lead on Doctor Bargaining, HOUS. CHRON., June 
22, 1999, at 1C.  
122See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 29.01-29.14 (West 1999).  
123§ 29.09; see also 1999 Legislative Compendium, supra note 120. 
124TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.07 (West 1999); see also 1999 Legislative Compendium, 
supra note 120. 
125TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.09 (West 1999); see also 1999 Legislative Compendium, 
supra note 120. 
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by physicians to health benefit plan enrollees.130  Perhaps most importantly, this 
Texas statute expressly prohibits physicians from engaging in strikes, boycotts, or 
reductions in the provision of health care services.131  It thereby lays to rest what is 
perhaps the greatest fear of those who are against collective negotiating by 
physicians, namely that of hospitals being completely devoid of physicians when 
they or their loved ones are in need of medical treatment. 
While the true merits of Texas’s answer to the great imbalance of bargaining 
power between independent physicians and insurance companies or HMOs has yet to 
undergo the test of time, it seems on its face to be a reasonable and potentially 
effective solution.  This statute enables physicians, who might traditionally be 
referred to as independent contractors, to unite to increase their bargaining power in 
contract negotiations.132  Yet, at the same time, it limits the percentage of physicians 
in a specialty who can legally unite to jointly negotiate with HMOs and expressly 
forbids walk-outs or strikes.133  Thus, the statute seems to be a fairly effective 
compromise, enabling physicians to gain additional bargaining power and control 
over the treatment of their patients, while preventing them from amassing too much 
power or threatening accessibility to health care services. 
While arguably preferable to a total lack of legislative action on any level, it 
seems apparent that the current evils inherent to the antitrust laws could more 
efficiently be combated through the enactment of federal legislation.  While anti-
competitive agreements and restraints of trade within the health care industry are 
likely to have their greatest impact on the local level, the federal antitrust laws are 
likely to be their principal sources of opposition.  State laws in this area can 
essentially be viewed as supplementary, as they can impose greater restrictions upon 
state citizens but not grant immunity from liability under the federal laws.134  For 
example, the requirements under the Texas statute are actually more restrictive than 
those provided in the Policy Statement of the FTC and DOJ.  As such, logic dictates 
that any substantial changes in the antitrust laws, such as providing an exemption for 
independently practicing physicians, should properly be made at the federal level.  
C.  Viable Option 3:  Amend the Federal Antitrust Laws 
The most effective way to combat the imbalance of power within the health care 
industry would undoubtedly be to simply amend the current federal antitrust laws.  
Representative Tom Campbell from California has recently sponsored a Bill, 
commonly referred to as the “Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999,” 
[hereinafter “QHCCA”] intended to: 
ensure and foster continued patient safety and quality of care by making 
the antitrust laws apply to negotiations between groups of health care 
                                                                
130Id. 
131§ 29.10 (providing in pertinent part: “[n]othing contained in this chapter shall be 
construed to enable physicians to jointly coordinate any cessation, reduction, or limitation of 
health care services”). 
132See §§ 29.01-29.14. 
133Id. 
134Id. 
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professionals and health plans and health insurance issuers in the same 
manner as such laws apply to collective bargaining by labor organizations 
under the National Labor Relations Act.135   
Essentially, this Bill, if enacted, would allow independent physicians who unite for 
contract negotiation purposes to be treated as employees, rather than as independent 
contractors, employers, managerial employees, or supervisors, thereby permitting 
them to evade antitrust liability.136  This proposed exemption from federal antitrust 
law seems to be intended to allow physicians to match the bargaining power of 
HMOs in contract negotiations and to have a greater say in the proper course of 
treatment for their patients.137  The bill, also referred to as H.R. 1304, was 
cosponsored by 137 members of Congress138 and has already been presented to the 
House Judiciary Committee.139  
This legislation has been described as a response to the heavy handed negotiating 
tactics of health insurers, that already benefit from preferential treatment under the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which has come to characterize the American health care 
industry.140  This imbalance of bargaining power leads to health care providers being 
forced to succumb to restrictive contractual terms, which are often proffered on a 
“take-it-or-leave-it” basis, under the threat of being removed from the health plan’s 
physician list or being denied access to its patients.141  Proponents of H.R. 1304 
maintain that medical professionals should be permitted to unite to collectively 
bargain with insurers to obtain the best possible contract terms, allowing market 
                                                                
135Suhail Khan, Thamas, at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c106:1:./temp?~ 
c1065MELER>. 
136Id.  The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999 entitles any health care professional 
negotiating with a health plan regarding contract terms under which they provide health care 
items or services for which plan benefits are provided to the same treatment under antitrust 
laws as that accorded to a collective bargaining unit recognized under the National Labor 
Relations Act.  Suhail Khan, at Thamas, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106: 
HR01304:@@@D&summ2=m&>. 
137See Suhail Khan, Thamas, at <http://www.house.gov/campbell>.  The purpose of H.R. 
1304 is to improve the health care industry by allowing medical professionals, such as doctors, 
pharmacists, and nurses, to collectively bargain in contract negotiations with HMO’s and other 
health care issuers.  Suhail Khan, Thamas, at <http://www.house.gov/campbell/leg.htm.>  In 
describing the desired effect of this legislation on the health care system, Congressman 
Campbell has stated, “(i)t is my strong belief that patients will be better served when fair and 
equitable contracts are negotiated by professionals, acting together, who are closest to the 
needs of their patients.  First on the list of contractual terms that healthcare professionals will 
demand in these negotiations is a greater right to prescribe and care for patients as they see 
fit.”  Id.   
138See  Suhail Khan, Thamas, at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:HR01304: 
@@@P> (providing a complete listing of the cosponsors of H.R. 1304). 
139Suhail Khan, Thamas, at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query>. 
140Suhail Khan, Thamas, at <http://www.house.gov/campbell/990325.htm>. 
141Id. 
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forces, rather than the federal government, to specify the parameters of the health 
care provider-insurer relationship.142   
In describing this proposed legislation, Congressman Campbell has stated: 
this legislation is the best way to let the market deal with the complaints 
so many health care professionals have raised with HMOs.  Health care 
professionals, including physicians, nurses, pharmacists, dentists and 
midwives, should be given the option to form their own professional 
associations and bargain with the HMOs in their service area.  This will 
ensure that all health care professionals will be able to secure contracts of 
a fair and equitable nature, and the patients will be better served.143    
He maintains that allowing medical professionals, including physicians, pharmacists 
and nurses, to bargain together in contract negotiations with health care issuers such 
as HMOs, will serve to improve our nation’s health care system by returning a 
greater right to control the course of treatment to the medical professionals who the 
needs of their patients.144  
While this proposed legislation has received substantial support, it has also been 
met by considerable opposition.  Among those opposed to its enactment is the 
Antitrust Division of the DOJ, which has expressed its collective belief that its 
enactment would serve to harm consumers of health care in the long run.145  In his 
statement concerning H.R. 1304 before the House Judiciary Committee, Joel Klein, 
Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, maintained that this 
legislation would serve to destroy the free-market competition that is essential to our 
nation’s economic vitality and has yielded the benefits of innovation, increased 
choice, and the lessening of prices for services.146  He also argued that the chief 
arguments of the supporters of this Bill are unfounded and inadequate to justify its 
enactment.147  Specifically, he maintained that: the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not 
provide insurers with unfair market leverage or exempt their activities from antitrust 
scrutiny; the relative bargaining power of HMOs varies significantly across markets 
and does not stifle competition to the extent that Bill supporters maintain; and that 
the Bill provides no assurances that the collective bargaining efforts of health care 
professionals will yield a higher quality of care, rather than simply fattening their 
own pockets.148  
It seems that the position of the DOJ is that this proposed Bill would have a 
drastically adverse economic effect upon consumers.  It maintains that medical 
                                                                
142Id. 
143Id. 
144Suhail Khan, Thomas, at <http://www.house.gov/ campbell/leg.htm>. 
145The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999: Hearings on H.R. 1304 Before the 
House Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. 1 (1999) (statement of Joel I. Klein). 
146Id. at 1. 
147Id. at 4. 
148Id. at 1 (referring to recently decided cases in which the DOJ and FTC challenged 
concerted actions by health care professionals, which the agencies determined would result in 
higher costs and diminished choices for health care consumers). 
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professionals will undoubtedly increase their fees significantly, should they be 
granted the ability to unite to jointly negotiate with insurers without regard to the 
antitrust laws.149  It further speculates that this would produce a sort of snowball 
effect, driving up insurance prices, increasing costs for Medicare and Medicaid, and 
ultimately harming the consumer.150  It also maintains that the resulting higher 
premiums will cause the percentage of citizens without insurance to greatly increase 
and lead many employers to either stop offering health insurance coverage to their 
employees or to decrease their benefits.151  The DOJ argument seems to be primarily 
financial, and dependent upon the warrantless assumption that health care 
professionals would use the increased bargaining power that the Bill would provide 
to substantially increase their incomes at the ultimate expense of their patients. 
One of the most adamant supporters of H.R. 1304 is the American Medical 
Association [hereinafter “AMA”].152  In his statement before the House Judiciary 
Committee in support of this Bill, E. Ratclifffe Anderson, Jr., M.D., Executive V.P. 
and C.E.O. of the AMA, expressed that this legislation was critically necessary to 
rectify the myriad of problems currently inherent to the health care system in this 
country.153  In particular, it was proposed that the current antitrust laws, coupled with 
the enforcement policy of the DOJ and FTC, are too restrictive on physicians, 
actually deterring them from engaging in pro-competitive behavior and unreasonably 
restraining their ability to stand up to health plans.154  Dr. Anderson maintains that 
the enactment of this Bill would serve to restore the balance of power in health care 
contract negotiations in favor of adequate representation and appropriate treatment of 
patients.155  In addition, he opined that the uniqueness of the health care industry, 
which is already substantially regulated by the government, justifies this limited 
modification of the antitrust laws reserved solely for that industry.156   
The crux of the AMA argument seems to be that it is actually the patients, or 
health care consumers, who would be the ultimate beneficiaries of the enactment of 
this Bill.  It is proposed that the increased bargaining power that it would grant to 
physicians would enable them to resume greater control over the treatment 
administered to their patients.157  Since treating physicians are naturally in a better 
position to determine which types of treatment are most appropriate for their 
patients, the quality of care which could be provided would be substantially 
improved.   
                                                                
149Id. at 4 (stating DOJ investigations purportedly demonstrate that when health care 
professionals jointly negotiate with insurers they typically seek substantial increases in their 
fees, sometimes by as much as twenty to forty percent). 
150KLEIN, supra note 46, at 5. 
151Id. 
152The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999, supra note 145 (statement of E. 
Ratcliffe Anderson, Jr., M.D., on behalf of the AMA). 
153Id. 
154Id. at 17. 
155Id. at 23. 
156Id. 
157The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999, supra note 145. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Definitive action is needed to clarify the scope of antitrust liability as it applies to 
independently practicing physicians and to level the playing field between physicians 
and MCPs.  Under the current antitrust laws, physicians are bullied by massive 
health care providers that dominate health care markets.  They have lost affirmative 
control over the ultimate administration of care of their patients.  While there may be 
no perfect solution to the imbalance of power that has come to characterize health 
care in America, the QHCCA is most attractive proposal to date.  In any event, 
federal legislation must be enacted to amend the current antitrust laws to allow for 
limited scale unionization or collusion between independent practitioners to 
collectively negotiate contract terms with MCPs.  
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